Swedish Volunteers in the Russo-Finnish Winter War, 1939-1940

Finland’s heroic struggle to preserve independence and defend its territories, citizens, and culture against the Russian superpower to the east has been acknowledged many times, as have the bravery and resourcefulness of the Finnish troops in the 105-day conflict termed the Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40 (hereafter shortened to the Winter War). But the story of the more than 8,000 Swedish volunteers who fought for Finland’s cause is largely unexplored outside the borders of Sweden. The difficulty of the political situation of neutral Sweden, sandwiched between Nazi Germany and the “Russian Bear,” resulted in that the country had to walk a diplomatic tightrope when determining if and how it would support Finland’s cause. Plans for a Swedish volunteer force were laid several months prior to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Finland on November 30, 1939. The day of the attack when the Red Army violated Finland’s borders and the Soviet air force bombed Helsinki, volunteer recruitment centers opened within Sweden. 

Sweden’s goal in coming to the aid of Finland was two-fold: to preserve Finland as a buffer against Russia—if Finland fell, Sweden believed it would be next—and to preserve the tradition and camaraderie that existed between the Swedes and the Finns. But problems developed. Although the Swedish and Finnish soldiers were united in purpose, they had never trained under common command and did not speak the same language. Part of the Swedish volunteer force had received no military training at all, and only a small part had been trained in winter operations. Many of the soldiers, particularly those from southern Sweden, had never fired a weapon or stood on a pair of skis. The Swedish volunteers also lacked adequate supplies of weapons, ammunition, and clothing and faced several other difficulties such as frost injuries and influenza. 

Of even greater importance than the problems the individual soldiers suffered on the battlefield was perhaps the extraordinarily complex political situation that developed with respect to Swedish neutrality in World War II (or noncombatant status in the case of the Winter War). Germany’s invasion of Poland, and England’s and France’s declaration of war against Germany, did not threaten Sweden’s neutrality per se. Sweden’s geographical location by the Baltic Sea, however, and the access to numerous ports had made the country disputed territory for most of its history. Sweden’s natural resources of iron ore proved essential to Hitler’s weapons industry and became a hotly debated issue between the Western Allies and Germany throughout the war. Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Finland, which at first appeared an isolated incident not directly tied to the hostilities in the rest of Europe, came to upset the delicate balance of power in the region and mandated that Sweden act as a mediator for peace. Of utmost importance was that the Russo-Finnish conflict be kept separate from the greater war between Germany and the Allies. Had peace not come when it did roughly a hundred days after the first shots were fired, an Allied invasion of Sweden would have been probable and would have made Sweden a primary World War II battleground. 

The Winter War was not the first war in which Sweden had come to the assistance of a foreign nation. Although Sweden’s last “official” war took place in 1814—when the king to be, Karl XIV Johan (Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, one of Napoleon’s marshals who had been imported from France to be crown prince of Sweden and fix Sweden’s weak leadership), invaded Norway in an almost bloodless conflict that resulted in three dead and fifteen injured Swedish soldiers, and forced Norway into union with Sweden—and despite Sweden’s neutrality declaration in both world wars, Swedish citizens had participated in foreign wars and humanitarian missions on several continents from the nineteenth century to present day, often fighting for the ideal of helping an oppressed people attain social and political equality. These wars ranged from Denmark’s conflicts with the German states in the mid-nineteenth century to the Anglo-Boer War in the early twentieth century when a small number of Swedish volunteers fought on the side of the Boer Republics (an even smaller number was engaged on the British side as well). In the twentieth century, Swedish volunteers joined the Swedish Brigade and served in the Finnish Civil War of 1918 (also called Finland’s War of Independence) on the side of the “white” nationalists against the “red” communists. Swedish volunteers fought in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 on the side of the government in the struggle against Francisco Franco’s forces who were supported by Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. After the conclusion of the Russo-Finnish Winter War, which is the focus of this book, Swedish volunteers served in the Finnish Continuation War of 1941-44, and in the German Waffen-SS in the anti-Bolshevik campaign in the Soviet Union. The number of Swedish volunteers in most of these wars was relatively low totaling in the hundreds (the Continuation War employed approximately 1,700 volunteers in the Finnish Army). Only in the Winter War did the number of volunteers reach an amazing 8,260, with several thousand more applicants desiring to serve but never seeing battle. 

At the start of the war, the Swedish government considered it unsuitable to publicly announce its intention to support the volunteers who went to Finland to fight. Earlier that year, Germany and the Soviet Union had entered into a treaty of nonaggression—the Nichtangriffspakt—for the purpose of preventing or at least delaying hostilities toward one another. A key issue of this pact was the mutual promise to come to each other’s assistance should either country come under attack by a third party. Sweden thus feared that if the volunteer corps became public knowledge, Germany would enter the war in defense of the Soviet Union. Some historians have argued that Sweden was overly worried about a German retaliation and that it was not in Hitler’s best interest to allow the Soviet Union to conquer Finland and establish itself so close to the Swedish iron ore mines. It is possible that Hitler was in favor of a long conflict between the Soviets and the Finns because it would have prevented Stalin from focusing on the Balkans. Although the Western Allies offered to send help to Finland, Sweden denied these troops passage through northern Sweden because it would violate Swedish neutrality and jeopardize relations with Germany. Concerns also lingered that the Allies might occupy the mines in northern Sweden and halt the exports of iron ore to Germany. Such an event would certainly trigger a German retaliation. If Sweden were pulled into the war, there would be very unhappy consequences for all of Scandinavia. A recurring question was thus the extent to which Sweden should exercise neutrality. Restraint was necessary in order to assume a strictly defensive role in the war. At the same time, the Swedes believed that they had an obligation to come to the assistance of the other Nordic countries including Finland with materiel and voluntary manpower. 

The first volunteers arrived in Finland around the turn of the year. Although the volunteer corps was initially forbidden to advertise in the newspapers, a few weeks into the war the government allowed the recruitment centers to advertise on public transport. Meanwhile, more recruitment centers opened in Sweden, working feverishly until 8,260 volunteers of 12,705 applicants stood ready to support Finland’s cause. The Swedish volunteer force became one of the largest assembly of volunteers in any modern war. In addition to the troops fighting at the Salla front in northern Finland, approximately two hundred men served in the artillery in Vasa in the western part of Finland. Another few hundred served in the air defense of Turku (see also Åbo), in the coastal defense of the Pellinki Islands east of Helsinki, and in a small fighter and bomber squadron in northern Finland. Several hundred doctors and nurses (and veterinarians for the horses) volunteered at military and civilian hospitals, and in field hospitals established by the Swedish Red Cross. 

Despite Sweden’s enormous efforts to support Finland, the role of the Swedish volunteers has been mentioned only in passing in history books about World War II. If Sweden is mentioned at all, it is generally with focus on the questionable and much debated neutrality breach toward the end of the war when Sweden allowed German troops on leave to transit through Swedish territory. Moreover, Russian and Finnish history is often overshadowed by the attention afforded the German soldier in written sources detailing the World War II experience. Sweden’s role in the Winter War may therefore seem even less significant when viewed against the backdrop of twentieth century war history. The purpose of this book is to fill that gap by examining the trials and tribulations of the Swedish volunteer force in the Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940; a conflict that stretched across the desolate and difficult terrain of the thirteen hundred kilometer long border between Finland and the Soviet Union, much of which consisted of marshes and forests with few and poorly maintained roads. The book will bring attention to the unusually large number of volunteers, unequalled in any other military volunteer mission, who in defense of Western democracy offered their lives for Finland’s cause on the ground and in the air. 

Although the focus of the book is the Swedish volunteer force in Finland, history and politics cannot be studied in isolation. In order to provide a more complete picture of the complex situation that became World War II, some overlap with respect to Finnish and Soviet combat operations is necessary, as is a study of Soviet, German, and Allied political interactions. A secondary aim of the book is to dissect the political situation that neutral Sweden, a country of relative obscurity, had to juggle in order to further its most cherished values of social equality and economic security in a time that demanded military buildup and political involvement on the world scene. The role that the Winter War played in the early stages of World War II helped shape many of the decisions made by Germany’s Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler, and makes the study of the political and social conditions on the Scandinavian Peninsula particularly crucial to understanding the development of the conflict between Germany and the Western Allies and Hitler’s subsequent invasion of the Soviet Union. 

The purpose of the book is to offer a new perspective on the Winter War by approaching it from the viewpoint of neutral Sweden. The book is divided into five parts. Part I examines the political background of the Winter War and the events that preceded the conflict, the Soviet Union’s request for territory, and the first shots fired at Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus. It provides an assessment of the Soviet Union’s strategic plan, Finland’s defensive measures, and Sweden’s reaction to the war. Part II brings to light the extraordinary efforts Sweden made to send material assistance to Finland. It discusses recruitment propaganda, volunteer arrival and training in Torneå by the Finnish-Swedish border at the top of the Gulf of Bothnia, and the difficulties the volunteers encountered during the ski-march to the front. Part III covers combat operations on the ground and in the air including the setbacks the volunteers suffered due to weather and terrain in subsequent battles against the Soviets. This part also analyzes the tactics of the primary belligerents: the Finnish and Soviet armies. Part IV examines the role of Sweden as a mediator for peace, the threat of invasion by the Western Allies, and the possibility that the war would be brought to the Scandinavian Peninsula. It discusses the political struggles that led to the armistice on March 13, 1940, and the concessions Finland had to make as a result of the hard-won peace. It covers the final bloody exchange and the general sentiment of the soldiers once they learned that peace had been negotiated. Part V provides an analysis of the Finnish, Soviet, and Swedish armies; their accomplishments and losses, and their strengths and weaknesses. An assessment is made of the conditions experienced by the volunteers taken captives in Soviet prison camps. This part also discusses the social and political forces that motivated the Swedish leadership to promote neutrality and avoid official military engagement in the war. 

For her research, the author has relied on a large number of primary source material including political documents, telegrams and other correspondence, and accounts of individual experiences such as memoirs, diaries, and military logs detailing the day-to-day activities of the war. A number of secondary sources including books, articles, and documentaries have also been enlisted in order to provide a balanced perspective that is as void as possible of the author’s personal biases. The author is indebted to Bo Lundström, Per Clason, and Bertil Olofsson at the War Archives in Stockholm, Sweden for help in answering questions, locating documents, and providing most of the photos that appear in this book.

Photos from Swedish War Archives. The recruitment poster, which is displayed at the Army Museum in Stockholm, Sweden, shows a Finnish and Swedish soldier side by side on skis and reads, "Finland's cause is ours! For a greater struggle, join the Volunteer Corps." The cannon is a 40-millimeter anti-aircraft artillery cannon. Approximately 2,500 rounds were fired with this type of cannon during the Winter War, with eight confirmed hits against enemy aircraft. Note the swastika on the side of the aircraft fuselage. The swastika was not related to Nazi Germany, but is historically a sign of good luck and was portrayed in blue on a white background in the colors of the Finnish flag.

 

BUY