For God, Gold, and Glory: A History of Military Service

Steven Pressfield’s rendition of Alexander the Great’s realization that nothing mattered as he stood before the Range of Perpetual Snows contemplating his next move on his historical journey of conquest, “not weapons or tactics, philosophy or patriotism, nor fear of the gods themselves,” except for “the love of glory,” is revealing of man’s quest for immortality at the prime of his life. This account of an event that transpired more than two millennia ago does not differ a great deal from the stories that soldiers of our own time tell about their desires to lead men into battle, “banners fluttering and swords valiantly raised.”

Soldiers fight for a variety of reasons, such as a sense of patriotic duty. In 1801 Stephen Decatur, the son of a famous naval captain of America’s Revolutionary War, sailed for the Mediterranean in search of glory and adventure. He found both during his conflicts with the Barbary States and upon his return was celebrated as a military hero. He is remembered for coining the phrase, “My country, right or wrong.” Some say that he helped “forge a new nation out of thirteen former colonies” by kindling “the flames of patriotism.” But acts of loyalty are largely based on the belief in a personal stake in the institution of war. The conflicts with the Barbary States and privateering—the government authorization of a private ship to attack and seize the cargo of another country’s ship—in waters closer to home were activities undertaken primarily with economic and trade interests in mind.

Patriotism has traditionally been understood to mean a willingness to sacrifice for one’s country and fully supporting one’s government in time of war. The Germans in World War II were undoubtedly patriotic, as evidenced by their nearly unflinching support of Adolf Hitler in his search for Lebensraum (living space) in the east. But several unfolding and interlocking events complicated Operation Barbarossa, Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. The German leadership had underestimated Soviet endurance and readiness to sacrifice, and German intelligence proved faulty in its estimation that Stalin lacked the reserves necessary to raise new forces for the Red Army. The Soviet leaders and their soldiers provided stubborn resistance, while enjoying the advantages of the proximity to resources for sustaining their efforts. Poor weather further aggravated the German advance. Germany’s overextension into Soviet territory can also be contrasted with the Soviet Union’s temporary concentration of power at a few critical points. The failure of Operation Barbarossa eventually aided the Allied victory over Nazi Germany, notwithstanding the patriotism of the German people. 

Three decades later an American fighter pilot remembers the excitement as he left for the war in Vietnam, “heading for the jungles of Southeast Asia to stem the sweeping red tide of monolithic communism that was sure to engulf nation after nation in the third world . . . Better to fight them over there,” he was told, “than on the streets of San Francisco.” But unable to produce a viable strategy in Vietnam particularly prior to 1968, the United States relied on a piecemeal commitment of forces. More importantly, the American public was not prepared to fight a war of long duration with no tangible end in sight. Giving the South Vietnamese the main burden of the war, while keeping the military commitment low enough that it could be terminated at any time, would assure no major negative consequences for the United States, it was reasoned. But the South Vietnamese proved unstable and unable to act effectively, simultaneously as the North Vietnamese thought no sacrifice too great in their strife for sovereignty. Bui Tin, a North Vietnamese colonel who was loyal to Ho Chi Minh but later defected to France, stated, “When we embarked on the struggle for our independence of course nobody realized it would result in more than thirty years of war which would have widespread effects on every Vietnamese family without exception. But people endured and held firm in the belief that independence and freedom were more precious than anything else and that once they were achieved, everything else would follow.” From the perspective of the Vietnamese communists, patriotism allowed them to win the war. 

These examples demonstrate that the end result of a war neither depends solely on a willingness to support one’s government, nor on strategy or equipment or the composition of the forces. Whether a country operates under the status of aggressor or defender can further affect the people’s sense of patriotic duty. The Vietnam War, in which the United States supported South Vietnam against the North Vietnamese communists from a position of the strategic offensive, proved unpopular with the American people. A greater degree of patriotism was displayed in the traditional sense when the United States entered World War II from a position of the strategic defensive following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Likewise, although a few American war protesters walked the streets of New York City after Osama bin Laden’s attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, the American people at large favored the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan from a position of the strategic defensive. 

Herodotus, the great Greek historian of the Greco-Persian Wars of the fifth century BCE, believed that “revenge [sometimes divine], kinship, and obligation were key motivating forces” that assisted men in their decisions to go to war. But the idea that man’s enthusiasm for military service is based on a love of country or a hatred of the enemy can prove misleading. Service in the armed forces is also a popular choice for men afflicted by poverty. “Indeed, ‘marginalized’ socioeconomic areas have traditionally provided disproportionate numbers of recruits for all conflicts, including quite modern wars.” The inequities of the Selective Service System have allowed well-to-do college students to escape the draft. The Vietnam War was fought largely by working-class or rural youth draftees, many of whom never finished high school. 

The effect a man’s financial situation has on the likelihood that he will enter military service does not apply only to North America, but was evident long before the war in Southeast Asia. In the Viking Age (c. 793-1066), for example, sailing opened the way to adventure. Some Norsemen saw it as an opportunity to follow their dreams and escape the boredom of everyday life; others viewed it as a necessity when the population had grown too large for the land to support. Still others sailed as a result of being excluded from their family’s inheritance. If a Viking man had older siblings, not much would be left for him at home in terms of inheritance. Piracy was a good alternative and could be used as a possible get-rich-quick scheme. No matter how one viewed it, sailing in the Viking Age gave a man better opportunities to improve his lot in life. 

In mid-nineteenth century America economic factors often proved foremost in a man’s decision to enlist. “Laborers who lost their jobs during economic depressions sometimes turned to the army in desperation, while immigrants were frequently destitute when they arrived at a seaport city.” The Soviet Union experienced similar concerns at the outbreak of World War II, when “one of the best routes to a richer life, at least for those of humble origin, was military service.” By contrast, men of wealth and status have historically been exempt from military service in most countries of the world, choosing instead to fulfill their duty to the state by paying a substitute to take their place. As late as the 1890s, Sweden granted a conscript the option to hire a mercenary in his stead, as long as the mercenary was between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-seven. If he had prior military experience, the maximum age was forty. This option did not really prove helpful for calming the discontent among the commoners, because only the financially established elite could afford the hired mercenary.

The United States resorted to similar enlistment strategies. During the conscription efforts in World War I, the complex quota system that the War Department employed resulted in that an estimated 500,000 of the volunteers “could be counted as substitutes for potential draftees.” The prospect of financial gain has also lured those from slightly more favorable economic backgrounds into military service. In the summer of 2007 the U.S. Army offered a twenty thousand dollar “Quick Shipper” enlistment bonus to those willing to answer the army’s call to duty and ship out for training within thirty days, with possible service in Iraq or Afghanistan. Nineteen year old Willard McCormick admitted that he was bored with life on his family’s South Carolina horse farm, and that the commitment to join the military got a whole lot easier in light of the twenty thousand dollar bonus. Although not necessary for survival in this case, the financial incentive helped solidify the decision.

In addition to offering recruits financial incentives, such as cash bonuses and the promise of a college education, countries in most parts of the world have relied on mercenary soldiers for centuries, and continue to do so today. The mercenary finds it difficult to turn down an opportunity to make more money in one month than he can hope to make in a full year in a civilian job. The use of mercenaries can also lead to “a swelling of armed strength. A wealthy state [can] raise a professional force larger than any citizen army and of equal or superior quality.” In 2006 Britain employed “an estimated twenty-one thousand mercenaries working for British firms in Iraq, compared to seventy-two hundred active duty British troops.” With respect to American involvement in the Middle East in 2007, “according to Central Command, 137,000 private contractors are working in Iraq under Defense Department contracts.” This mercenary force is larger than the number of troops employed by the U.S. Armed Forces. 

Mercenary service has historically allowed men to alleviate both poverty and hunger. Unlike regular volunteer or conscripted armies, mercenaries do not fight from a sense of patriotic duty. While some mercenaries simply see themselves as soldiers, they have historically been motivated by their personal acquisitions, mostly in the form of money and not in what they can do for the state. If the enemy offers more pay or better conditions, a mercenary might switch sides in the midst of a war. Some countries, such as Egypt, have historically left “distasteful activities like fighting” to foreigners. Although these foreigners were skilled at the profession of fighting wars, “the great mass of them had no heartfelt loyalty to the state.” To build up their budgets, some of the weaker states in the 1700s also hired out their militaries to fight other countries’ wars. In the twenty-first century the private military firm Blackwater USA served the United States in a number of civilian catastrophes and military conflicts ranging from Hurricane Katrina to Iraq, and also operated for the purpose of meeting “emergent or existing security requirements for client needs overseas.” Its new division, Greystone Limited, draws its recruits from “the Philippines, Chile, Nepal, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, and Peru.” 

This book examines the history of military service and man’s search for power, wealth, and adventure. In the words of British historian and philosopher Sir Herbert Butterfield, battle is about the behavior of men, “their sense of honor and the achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill them. The study of battle is therefore always a study of fear and usually of courage, usually also of faith and sometimes vision.” Those who answered the call to war, did they find the challenge they were seeking? Did they get what they were promised? 

 

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