Understanding Carl von Clausewitz

Carl von Clausewitz believed that a useful theory must include all elements that pertain to battle. Not just the measurable, such as physical distances, but also the intangible, such as "morale and the commanders' psychology," and "common sense and logic." Theory gives structure to fact, relates the past to the present through logical links, and strengthens and refines judgment. Or as Clausewitz said, "An accurate and penetrating understanding is a more useful and essential asset for the commander than any gift for cunning." 

Clausewitz presented his ideas as timeless and consistent theory of conflict. He sought to discover a universal nature of warfare, while illustrating his principles through the use of specific examples. His background and experiences, and the fact that the national state in Prussia was militarized quickly and performed reasonably well in war even when they had committed only "part of their military resources," certainly influenced his ideas. But Clausewitz was foremost a practical soldier over a theoretician and had spent most of his life participating in warfare in one way or another. He believed that those who have no knowledge other than that derived from experience have only experience to fall back on, and all action will therefore arise based on prior experience. 

At the heart of his theory is the theme that war is talked about in one way and exercised in another. War is therefore neither a complete science, nor a complete art. Science is the act of knowing, and art is the act of doing. Science requires knowledge, but art requires judgment. Since the practice of art requires individual talent, or the capacity to create, it is not possible to establish a set of rules, for instance, that hold true in every situation for every commander. War employs constant change. Crafting a universal strategy for warfare that proves useful in every situation is therefore not possible. 

Along these lines, Clausewitz also believed that mathematical laws, and particularly numbers, although used by theoreticians to calculate probable outcomes and provide definite figures, cannot stand the test of practical application. Numbers become arbitrary in the art of war, and tend to force "theorists into a direction opposed to common sense." The combat itself is the only way to make sense of war. In this regard, there are three critical operations of the mind: historical investigation, the determination of doubtful facts, and the tracing of effects and causes. All things have to be traced to the beginning, and not rest on arbitrary assumptions and suppositions. Rules should therefore be guidelines, or points of reference, to which the commander applies his judgment, and actions must be modified upon passing from theory to reality. This is also why war belongs neither entirely to science nor entirely to art, but rather to social life since it is a conflict of interests. 

Although Clausewitz acknowledged the social component of war, he ignored ethics in his study, because he considered it not belonging to the "theory of war." The "social act" of war "lies beyond war itself." When morals are mixed with theories, rules dissolve into vague ideas. The conduct of war and the morality of war must therefore be separated. The military strategist does not consider whether the objective is ethical or not. He thinks only of winning the war. 

Although Clausewitz recognized the futility of using scientific calculations in the art of war, his theories of conflict do not completely discredit scientific warfare, however. A prescriptive set of rules does bring familiarity to the commander and soldiers and can, at least to an extent, be applied to discipline and battlefield formations. When a soldier knows his position in the formation, the risk of encountering uncertainty and chance is reduced. Furthermore, although the enemy's will is difficult to control and the element of chance can strike either belligerent, in order to create a set of workable guidelines for war, one must conduct a "comprehensive and scientific analysis." 

While others categorized wars into different sets of philosophies; for example, the eschatological philosophy, which states that there will be a final war, normally of divine influence, after which there will be no more wars (as when Christ returns), Clausewitz believed that wars were purely political in nature. Prior to the Age of Enlightenment and the French Revolution, war was mainly the concern of the government and not of the people. Since the government was viewed as a separate entity from the state (which was, in fact, the people), the government could not recruit a truly efficient army, but must rely on recruiting the poorer people who were willing to serve, or on mercenaries who lacked a sense of patriotism and could become a threat to those in power if not paid well. There were other drawbacks. For example, when the state could not recruit quality personnel, and had to rely only on the money in its coffers and could thus gauge the enemy's potential, war was "deprived of its most dangerous feature—its tendency toward the extreme, and of the whole chain of unknown possibilities that would follow." 

In Clausewitz's time, by contrast, the capacity to wage war had evolved to a point where a state's military power depended on its financial capacity, and its capacity to enlist the masses in military service. The responsibility for war fell on the government, to which the people were obligated to serve and pay taxes. The power of the government thus grew stronger than in the past. 

The basic tenets of Clausewitz's philosophy of international relations hold that the state is a living, sovereign entity with the goal to increase its power at the expense of other states. States are therefore always in conflict with one another, and war consists of one state imposing its will on another. Since nations and empires are built through violence and continue to relate to each other through violence, warfare cannot be avoided, at least not for an extended period of time, and should therefore be accepted as a normal state of human existence. Clausewitz definition of war is that "war is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will." If it were not for certain frictions and physical limitations, war would always be absolute, where every action would be directed toward the achievement of victory. A head of state, who dared not justify starting a war by imposing his will on the opponent, or who would fight a purely defensive war, was, in Clausewitz's view, "an absurdity." 

War should thus not be waged for its own sake, but should be a rational effort and lead to the achievement of some gain or higher political objective. War should also be waged with the aim of achieving victory as quickly as possible. In accordance with these thoughts, war should not be waged for personal glory or a desire for adventure. War should be fought by the state only for the purpose of achieving a defined political objective, and never for adventurist reasons. Since quick victory was of primary concern, World War I, for example, which was waged over a period of years in a seemingly stalemate condition, would be a poor example of Clausewitz's philosophy of what war is and should be. 

 

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